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SYMPOSIUM: ERIE UNDER ADVISEMENT:
THE DOCTRINE AFTER SHADY GROVE
FOREWORD: ERIE's GIFT
Jay Tidmarsh*

Sometimes described as "one of the modem cornerstones of our
federalism,"' Erie2 stands at its narrowest for a simple proposition:
When a federal court decides a claim whose source is state law, the court
must apply the same substantive common-law rules that a state court
would apply to the claim. Dictated by statute,3 by policy,4 and by the
Constitution,' this result seems "superbly right"'6 to many. Indeed,
Erie's narrow holding is not controversial today.
But Erie casts a much longer shadow than its narrow holding, and
this broader influence remains contested ground. Erie has an important
but concededly opaque bearing on the relationship between state and
federal courts, the relationship between state and federal law, and the

* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.

1. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
2. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3. Id. at 71-74. The statute that Erie interpreted was section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
1 Stat. 73, 92 (1845) (presently codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2008)).
4. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-78. Erie cited discrimination against citizens whose claims allowed
their opponents to seek refuge in federal court, lack of uniform application of state law within a
state, and forum shopping as undesirable consequences if federal courts were not required to follow
the authoritative common-law rules of a state.
5. Id. at 78-79. Erie did not identify the precise constitutional provision that was offended
when federal courts did not follow the authoritative common-law rules of a state. See generally
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 246-48 (2000)

(discussing possible constitutional foundations for Erie).
6. See PURCELL, supra note 5, at 247, quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Place of the Federal
Courts in the Constitutional Plan (undated, ca. 1955).
7. But see PURCELL, supra note 5, at 201-16 (discussing the efforts of Justice Frankfurter to
erode and Professor Hart to recast the constitutional foundations for Erie); Suzanna Sherry, Wrong,
Out ofStep, and Pernicious:Erie as the Worst Decision ofAll Time, 39 PEPP. L. REV. (forthcoming
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=l 803458 (describing reasons
why Erie was wrongly decided).
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relationship between Congress and the federal courts. Erie also has a
complicated effect on the area that we usually call "procedure."
Erie's procedural puzzle is easy to describe. While it seems
unremarkable that a federal court should apply the state's authoritative
pronouncements about its substantive law when resolving a claim for
which state law provides the rule of decision,9 it is far more debatable
whether a federal court should apply the same procedural law that a
state court would. On the one hand, rules of procedure can influence
outcomes every bit as much as substantive rules.'o Therefore, if the
federal court uses its own rules of procedure rather than those that a state
court would have used, the outcome in a federal court could well be as
different from the result that the state court would have reached--even if
both courts use the same substantive rules." Differential outcomes can
lead to forum shopping, inequalities arising from the fortuity of the
parties' citizenship, and disrespect for state courts as the final arbiter of
their own law-exactly the concerns that Erie found problematic as both
a policy and a constitutional matter.12
On the other hand, federal courts, like all courts, have reasons to
apply uniform rules to process all claims (state or federal). Federal
procedural rules will be more familiar to the federal courts (and
therefore more efficient to apply), and these rules can also represent
important choices about how much power the federal courts should
exercise over the legal rights of the citizenry. Moreover, allocating
power to the states to dictate the process that federal courts must apply
in a segment of their caseload also raises structural concerns, for
Congress, and arguably the federal courts, have their own constitutional
authority to promulgate rules of federal procedure. 3

8.

See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND

THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 457 (6th ed. 2009) (suggesting that Erie might influence the capacity of the
United States Supreme Court to review state-law issues in cases arising out of state courts). Id. at
607-85 (discussing the rise of enclaves of federal common law in the wake of Erie).
9. But see Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (holding that federal courts were not
bound to accept a state court's authoritative pronouncements about its common law, but were free to
expound a federal general common law), overruled by Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
10. See, e.g., Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (noting that the use of
different rules of procedure can "significantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal court").
11. Id.
12. Id.atlll-12.
13. The constitutional authority of Congress derives from its powers to create lower federal
courts, see U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 9; id. art. III, § 1, and the Necessary and Proper Clause, see
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The authority for federal courts to create their own rules derives by
implication from the nature of the "judicial Power" vested in them, see id. art. III, § 1. See also
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As the last sentence suggests, the source of the federal rule
complicates the puzzle. Some federal procedural rules are constitutional
in origin. 14 Some derive directly" or indirectly 16 from congressional
command. Some are judge-made.' 7 Granting that federal courts must
comply with constitutional constraints even when a state rule of process
is different, 8 it is not obvious that federal courts have as much power to
apply judge-made procedural rules in the face of contrary state rules as
they have to apply procedural rules adopted or sanctioned by Congress. 9
When state law provides the substantive rule of decision, there are
respectable arguments that federal judges should calibrate their
procedural rules with an eye on the balance of power between the state
and federal courts. But procedural rules crafted by Congress represent
the democratically elected branch's judgment about the scope of federal
judicial power-a judgment that federal courts are bound to accept
unless unconstitutional. Federal procedural rules crafted by the Supreme
Court under a delegation of authority granted by Congress present an
intermediate case; close attention must be paid to the rules' compliance
with the precise terms of the delegation.
Another complication arises from difficulties of interpretation. As
a pragmatic matter, it makes no difference whether a federal court
applies a state or federal rule of procedure when both rules are the same.
Similarly, if differing state and federal procedural rules operate over
different domains, then there is no conflict and no need to choose
between them; both sets of rules can be given effect. Therefore, the
critical first step for a federal court is to interpret the state and federal
procedural rules to determine if an actual conflict between the two rules
exists. A second interpretive issue arises with respect to any federal
procedural rule enacted pursuant to a delegation of legislative authority.

Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 846-52 (2008) (evaluating
claims of federal courts' inherent constitutional authority to promulgate rules of procedure).
14. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. VII.
15. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2006) (describing transfer among federal districts).
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006) (delegating to the Supreme Court "the power to prescribe
general rules of practice and procedure" for the federal courts as long as these rules do "not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right").
17. See, e.g., Guar. Trust Co., 326 U.S. at 122 (refusing to permit a federal court to apply the
equitable, judge-made doctrine of laches).
18. Cf Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 535-40 (1958) (stating that a
federal jury should determine certain facts, even if the facts would have been determined by a judge
in state court; further noting the influence of the Seventh Amendment on this holding).
19. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469-70 (1965) (stating that the validity of a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure is determined under a different analysis than the validity of federal
common-law procedural rules).
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In the procedural context, the principal legislation is the Rules Enabling
Act, which allows the Supreme Court to "prescribe general rules of
practice and procedure" 20 as long as they do not "abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right." 2' The Supreme Court has used this
delegation of authority to promulgate most of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.2 2 The Enabling Act's curious language suggests that
Congress sees "procedure" and "substantive rights" not as dichotomous
subjects, but as overlapping. Because the Enabling Act defines neither
"procedure" nor "substantive rights," however, courts must give
meaning to both phrases to determine the breadth of the Act's delegation
and the validity of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. Third, in handling
these interpretive issues, a related question is how sensitive a federal
court should be to the concerns for federalism, separation of powers,
forum shopping, inequity, uniformity, administrability, and the
independence of federal courts that animate the Erie field, as opposed to
relying on the plain text of the statute or rules.
Another complicating factor is jurisprudential in nature. The
common criticism of the pre-Erie regime, in which federal courts were
able to develop their own rules of common law in derogation of the rules
chosen by state court, is its adherence to natural-law theory, or at least to
the theory that common-law adjudication ultimately yields a single best
rule of decision. In this regard, Erie is often regarded as a victory of
legal positivism over natural law." In considering the application of
Erie to procedural rules, a second jurisprudential cross-current of special
significance in American law is also in play. Unless we wish federal

20. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006).
21. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
22. A few portions of some Federal Rules were enacted by statute. See Pub. L. No. 102-198,
§ 11, 105 Stat. 1626 (1991) (amending then-existent Rule 15(c)(3)); Pub. L. No. 100-690, Title VII,
§ 7047(b), 102 Stat. 4401 (1988) (amending portions of Rule 35); Pub. L. No. 97-462, § 2, 96 Stat.
2527 (1983) (amending portions of Rule 4); Pub. L. No. 96-481, Title 1I, § 205(a), 94 Stat. 2330
(1981) (amending portions of Rule 37).
23. A famous articulation of the pre-Erieview is Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Guaranty
Trust:
Law was conceived as a "brooding omnipresence" of Reason, of which decisions were
merely evidence and not themselves the controlling formulations. Accordingly, federal
courts deemed themselves free to ascertain what Reason, and therefore Law, required
wholly independent of authoritatively declared State law ....
This impulse to freedom from the rules that controlled State courts regarding Statecreated rights was . . . strongly rooted in the prevailing views concerning the nature of
law....
Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 102 (1945) (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S.
205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting)) (some paragraphing omitted). On the extent to which Erie
in fact accepted a legal positivist account of law, see PURCELL, supra note 5, at 181-85, 296.
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courts to be mirror images of state courts in every jot, at some point we
must acknowledge the right of federal courts to use their own rules of
"procedure."
But that acknowledgment raises difficult issues of
definition: What is "procedure" and what is not? Is the definition of
"procedure" the same under the Rules Enabling Act as it is for judgemade rules? How sensitive should courts be to the reality that
procedural rules can affect the outcome of cases? In particular, should
they adopt a more "formalist" definition of procedure--one that does not
vary with circumstance and is not attuned to procedure's outcomeinfluencing capacity? Or should they adopt a more "realist" definitionone denying that "'substance' [and] 'procedure' represents the same
invariants" and acknowledging the real-world influence of process on
outcome? 24
Here the age-old jurisprudential argument between
formalism and realism is not taking place on the periphery of some
minor legal battlefield; it lies at the heart of one of the principal
divisions in all of law: the distinction between substance and procedure.
Finally, and relatedly, Erie's effect on procedure cuts to the heart of
law as a distinct intellectual enterprise. To put it mildly, the Supreme
Court's decisions in the "procedural Erie" area have not always
appeared consistent with each other.25 Yet the Court has never overruled
any of its cases, finding distinctions or developing analytical frameworks
to recast prior decisions in ways that uphold their results if not their
reasoning. Although the Court has now settled on the framework given
in Hanna v. Plumer,26 the framework has not ended all debate: in
difficult cases the framework has enough play in the joints that
controversies remain about the portion of the framework that procedural
rules should be shoehorned into. The raggedness of the Erie doctrine
exposes it to the criticism that "there is no law there"-that the present
framework is just a thin veneer covering judges' naked political

24. Guar. Trust Co., 326 U.S. at 108. For an oft-quoted statement of the same realist
perspective, see Walter Wheeler Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure"in the Conflict ofLaws, 42
YALE L.J. 333, 337 (1933) ("The tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more
legal rules, and so in connection with more than one purpose, has and should have precisely the
same scope in all of them ... has all the tenacity of original sin and must constantly be guarded
against.").
25. For a sampling of some of the significant cases, see Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1
(1941); Guar. Trust Co., 326 U.S. 99; Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530
(1949); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460 (1965); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980); Bus. Guides, Inc. v.
Chromatic Commc'ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533 (1991); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518
U.S. 415 (1996).
26. 380 U.S. at 468-71. For a famous and influential exegesis of this framework, see John
Hart Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REv. 693 (1974).
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preferences. Unless this criticism is to be conceded, there remains a
great need for lawyerly imagination that grounds the procedural Erie
doctrine in law.
In short, in the procedural area, Erie raises fundamental questions
about the jurisprudential, constitutional, interpretive, taxonomic, and
legal commitments of the American judicial system. For this reason, the
problem has occupied, and will continue to occupy, the attention of
leading scholars of constitutional and procedural law. Although the
Supreme Court decides procedural Erie cases infrequently, each new
case becomes an opportunity to re-examine fundamental commitments
in light of new circumstances.
The most recent case from the Supreme Court, Shady Grove
Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2 7 is the occasion
for the present symposium. Because a number of the articles in this
symposium recount the rich details of Shady Grove, I can state the
question with a high degree of abstraction. New York has a rule that
forbids its courts from maintaining class actions when the class seeks
statutory damages or penalties in excess of actual damages.2 8 Rule 23,
the federal class-action rule, has no comparable limitation. 29 In Shady
Grove the defendant allegedly failed to pay insurance claims on time,
thus subjecting itself under New York state law to a statutory penalty of
$500. Eschewing state court, which would have barred a class action in
this circumstance, the plaintiff brought a class action in federal court on
behalf of all other victims of the same alleged wrongdoing-thus
making the case worth more than $5 million.30
The choice in Shady Grove was stark. Either the federal court was
required to adopt the New York rule and deny class treatment (a decision
that likely sounded the death knell for the case, because a $500 claim
was not worth litigating), or apply Rule 23 and move forward with class
certification (a decision that might induce the defendant to settle for a
significant amount). For thousands of alleged victims and for the
defendant, the choice between the New York Rule and Rule 23
represented as "substantive" an impact as any "procedural" rule could
generate.
The Supreme Court held that the federal court should apply Rule
23, not the New York rule. Its reasoning, as the contributors to this
symposium explain, has left much room for continued discussion. To
27. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
28. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2006).
29.

FED. R. Civ. P. 23.

30. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437 & n.3.
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begin, on the critical issue about why the federal court should adopt Rule
23 rather than the New York rule, there was no majority opinion;3'
Justice Stevens supplied the critical fifth vote, but his reasoning for why
the federal court should apply Rule 23 was significantly different from,
and narrower than, the reasoning of the plurality. 32 Moreover, the
plurality was written by Justice Scalia, who had authored the dissent in
the last significant procedural Erie case, Gasperini v. Center for

Humanities,33 and whose methodology for interpreting the scope of Rule
23 seems at odds with another opinion he recently authored.34
Conversely, Justice Ginsburg, who had authored the majority opinion in
Gasperini, found herself authoring the dissent in Shady Grove.s
Confounding this switch in position is the fact that both Justices used the
same methodologies that they had used in Gasperini-with Justice
Scalia adopting a blunter, "formalist" approach that rendered the use of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in adjudicating state-law claims
nearly impervious to Erie challenges, and Justice Ginsburg adopting a
context-sensitive, "realist" approach that attempted to accommodate the
substantive interests of state courts and the procedural interests of
federal courts.
Although the range of views on the Court is great, the breadth of
views expressed by the authors in this symposium is even greater.
Professor Stempel 3 and Mr. Gaber' prefer Justice Scalia's approach,
albeit for very different reasons. Professor Stempel's argument is
especially interesting, examining the history of the New York ban on
statutory-damage class actions and arguing that Justice Scalia's broad

31. Id at 1436, 1442-44.
32. To make matters more complicated, Justice Stevens joined the part of Justice Scalia's
holding that Rule 23 and the New York rule were in conflict with each other, thus creating a
majority of five for this proposition. Id at 1436-42. This conflict then required the Court to choose
between Rule 23 and the New York rule. It was on the next question-why a federal court should
apply Rule 23 despite the conflict in the federal and state rules-that Justice Scalia and Justice
Stevens parted ways. Compare id at 1442-48 (plurality opinion) with id. at 1448-60 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). The dissent argued that Rule 23 and the New York rule were not in conflict, and that
the New York rule barring the class actions could therefore be given effect. Id at 1460-73
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
33. 518 U.S. 415, 448 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
34. Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503-04 (2001) (interpreting
Rule 41 narrowly to avoid arguable Erie concerns).
35. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 418-39 (Ginsburg, J.); Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1460-73
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
36. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Shady Grove and the PotentialDemocracy-EnhancingBenefits of
Erie Formalism,44 AKRON L. REv. 907 (2011).
37. Mark P. Gaber, MaintainingUniform FederalRules: Why the Shady Grove PluralityWas
Right, 44 AKRON L. REv. 979 (2011).
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decision to uphold Federal Rules that come into conflict with state rules
can have an important benefit of enhancing democracy by forcing states
to make substantive changes in the law openly, rather than by sneaking
them into procedural provisions likely to evade notice. Professor
Koppel favors Justice Stevens' moderate approach to achieving
procedural uniformity in federal court,3 8 and Professor Genetin favors
Justice Stevens' approach to determining whether a Federal Rule and a
state rule are in conflict." Professor Friedenthal suggests that Justice
Scalia may have taken a wrong interpretive turn in construing the New
York rule, and that this turn made Shady Grove a far more expansive
decision than any Erie opinion before it.4 0 Finally, Professor Doernberg
finds all of the opinions lacking, and suggests two alternative rules that
would do a better job for determining the application of federal
procedural rules to state-law claims-including his favored approach,
which derives from Justice Harlan's famous concurrence in Hanna.41
The articles also explore many of the deeper issues surrounding
Erie. All the articles manifest concern for the constitutional and
structural concerns that animated Erie and its procedural progeny.
Several articles, especially those by Professors Doernberg, Koppel, and
Stempel examine the jurisprudential commitments underlying the Erie
doctrine in general and the various opinions in Shady Grove in
particular. Professors Genetin and Friedenthal examine the difficulties
of, respectively, statutory and rule interpretation in the Erie context.
Professor Koppel emphasizes the value of procedural uniformity.
Professor Doernberg evaluates the relationship between the procedural
Erie doctrine and concerns for federalism. Mr. Gaber brings some
realpolitik to bear by assessing the relationship between Shady Grove
and the Class Action Fairness Act, which expanded federal jurisdiction
over class actions to curb the perceived liberality of state-court classaction practice.42

38. Glenn S. Koppel, The Fruits of Shady Grove: Seeing the Forestfor the Trees, 44 AKRON
L. REV. 999 (2011).
39. Bernadette Bollas Genetin, Reassessing the Avoidance Canon in Erie Cases, 44 AKRON L.
REV. 1067 (2011).
40. Jack Friedenthal, Defining the Word "Maintain"; Context Counts, 44 AKRON L. REV.
1139 (2011).
41. Donald L. Doemberg, "The Tempest": Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v.
Act
Decision
Enabling
The
Rules
Co.:
Allstate
Insurance
That Added to the Confusion-But Should Not Have, 44 AKRON L. REV. 1147 (2011). For Justice
Harlan's opinion, see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,474-78 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
42. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711-15 (2006)).
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In the political sense, the final chapter on Shady Grove has yet to be
written. This Term, the Court has taken up a number of cases with the
potential to narrow class-action practice at the federal level.43 If such a
narrowing occurs, the combination of the Class Action Fairness Act
(opening up federal courts to more class actions) and Shady Grove
(requiring the use of a narrowed Rule 23 in federal court) will put a
class-action remedy beyond the reach of many individuals injured by
widespread wrongdoing. Because class actions are largely used in
small-scale cases in which individual litigation is not viable, 44 such a
reshaping would also put any recovery beyond the reach of some
plaintiffs. But such a narrowing would also reduce a costly and
potentially abusive form of litigation.4 5 On the other hand, if the Court's
cases this Term treats Rule 23 more expansively, the combination of the
Class Action Fairness Act and Shady Grove will help to provide a viable
remedy for many victims of wrongdoing who otherwise might have no
realistic means to obtain relief-although at the risk of maintaining a
modicum of needlessly costly and frivolous litigation.
Whether Shady Grove was the first tactical move in a grand
political strategy to rein in American class actions will play out soon
enough. That eventuality is not the concern of these articles, which
demonstrate a commitment to analyzing Shady Grove as a legal matter,
not a political event. And perhaps that is as it should be. Collectively,
the articles show the wonderfully diverse set of legal issues that Erie
continues to spawn.
Few decisions nearing their seventy-fifth
anniversary have ever retained the salience and intellectual challenge
Conceived in political, economic, and legal
that Erie does.
circumstances far different from our own, Erie remains a mirror in

43. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S.
Ct. 795 (2010) (No. 10-277); Smith v. Bayer Corp., 593 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131
S. Ct. 61 (2010) (No. 09-1205); Laster v. AT&T Mobility, Inc., 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), cert.
granted sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010) (No. 09-893).
44. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 597, 617 (1997) (noting that ."[t]he policy
at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do
not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights"')
(quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)); see also Shady Grove,
130 S. Ct. 1431, 1460 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that using Rule 23 can "transform a
$500 case into a $5,000,000 award").
45. For cases noting that class actions can browbeat defendants to settle frivolous litigation,
see, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,
Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). For an article describing the agency-cost problems that largescale, small-stakes class actions pose, see Jonathon R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintifs'
Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:
Economic Analysis and
Recommendationsfor Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991).
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which our modern-day constitutional and legal commitments find
reflection. An undue focus on the political elements in Shady Grove
misses Erie's transcendent gift.

